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food items served in connection with the meal is desirable.'8 This liabil-
ity may be justified for the same reason that one who chooses to engage
in an ultra-hazardous activity is held absolutely liable.'9
JOHN M. BowsHER
x The rule laid down in the Year Books recognized an insurer's liability upon tav-
erners, victuallers and the like. "For if I come into a tavern to eat and the taverner gives
and sells me beer or goods which is corrupt, by which I am put to great suffering, I shall
clearly have an action against the taverner on the case even though he makes no warranty
to me." Year Book 9 Hen. VI S3. (Writer's Italics) This liability arose from the calling
or trade of the seller and as the result of old criminal statutes bottomed on public policy.
Burnby v. Bolett, x6 M. & W. 644, x53 Eng. Rep. 1348i Amss, LacTuaEs ON LFA.
HISTORY, p. 1375 3 HOLaSWORTH, HxsrORY oF ENGLIsiH LAw, pp. 385, 386, 447, 448;
MELICS, note 8, supra. The same reasons for the enforcement of the rule exist with even
greater force today.
" Parks v. Yost Pie Co, 93 Kan. 334, x44 Pac. 2oz (1914). See zS Yale L.J. 679
(zgs6).
TRADE REGULATIONS
EMPLOYER PROTECTION FROM EMPLOYEE COMPETITION
AFTER A TERM OF EMPLOYMENT
In the comparatively recent case of Curry v. Marquart1 the Su-
preme Court of Ohio had occasion, for the first time, to consider the
extent to which Ohio employers can protect themselves from the com-
petition of former employees. Plaintiff's business was that of dealer in
milk at wholesale, for whom the defendants operated a route. No writ-
ten lists of customers passed from employer to employees, nor did the
employer exact of these routemen covenants not to compete after the
termination of the employment. After a period of a few months, the
defendants broke off the relationship to establish a similar business,
competitive to the extent that their new route covered a portion of that
previously operated by them for the plaintiff. Faced with this threat of
competition at the hands of those familiar with his customers, plaintiff
sought the aid of a court of equity. Ohio doctrine seemed to favor his
suit, for in French Bros. Bauer Co. v. Townshend Bros. Milk Co.2 the
Court of Appeals for the First District had, despite the absence of a
written list of customers, enjoined similar employee competition on the
basis of a tort of unfair competition. But the Court of Appeals ruled
contrariwise in the instant litigation. Taking the case on a certification
of conflict, the Supreme Court adopted the view espoused by this latter
appellate court.
133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E. (zd) 868 (938).
zs Ohio App. 177, x52 N.E. 675 (xz).
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Although this view represents the weight of authority in the United
States today,3 its logical foundations are none too secure. For if the
absence of a written list is thought to gain its significance from equitable
considerations, the answer is that equity has not been hesitant in the
protection of intangible property rights, and that the right to carry on
a business free from unfair competition has often been termed a property
right sufficient to satisfy equity's demand.4 Functionally viewed, the
employer's economic interest is no different where the identity and
knowledge of his customers is carried away in the employee's memory
than when the appropriation is v a a written list. On the other hand, if
equity's refusal to relieve is based on the fact that the employer can
point here to nothing that belongs to him, the same must generally be
true even though a written list has changed hands. Surely the challenge
to orthodox conceptions of what is the property of the employer and
what of the employee cuts deeper than the form of the transaction
between employer and employee.
The failure of the Supreme Court of Ohio to accord to the employer
the maximum protection judicial legislation has devised for the situation
where no express covenant is involved, renders all the more pertinent
an examination of the extent to which such protection can be secured,
under present Ohio authorities, through dependence upon contract rather
than tort. Into this area the Supreme Court has never yet gone; the
decisions of the inferior state courts must continue to provide the answer.
In Jewel Tea Co. v. Wilson5 the covenant of a tea and coffee sales-
man not to compete in the city of Cleveland for one year after leaving
the plaintiff's employ was held valid by the Circuit Court of Cuyahoga
County, although injunctive relief was denied because of the wrongful
discharge of the salesman. The court regarded as immaterial the fact
that the employee disclosed no confidential information nor solicited
any of the plaintiff's customers, contenting itself with the statement that
the enforceability of such a contract is "too well established to require
discussion." In support were cited several leading decisions of the Ohio
Supreme Court, including Lange v. Werk' and Lufkin Rule Co. v.
Frngeli.' But these cases approved promises connected to the sale of a
business or the dissolution of a partnership; not one considered an
employer-employee covenant. By reliance upon such cases as precedent
3z3 A.L.R. 423 (923), 34 A.L.R. 399 (1925), 54 A.L.R. 350 (gz8); RESTATE-
MENT, AGENCY, sec. 3 9 6(b).
' Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 Fed. (2d) 273 (D.C. Okla. 193I); Hill Grocery
Co. v. Carroll, 223 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (93).
r2o Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 233 (x9x2).
z Ohio St. 520 (853).
7 57 Ohio St. 596, 49 N.E. 103o (1898).
the court must be understood to have meant that a restriction which is
reasonable when attached to the sale of a business and its goodwill is
also reasonable if ancillary to a contract of employment. Although, at
the time Jewel Tea Co. v. Wilson' was decided, little, if any, specific
authority advocated a distinction between these types of covenants, there
was increasing recognition of their economic dissimilarity, especially in
England, where courts were becoming more reluctant to uphold employ-
ment covenants than sale covenants. This attitude was the result of a
realization that, with the sale of a business, a promise not to compete
and its fulfillment is ordinarily essential for an adequate delivery of the
goodwill to the purchaser; but that this is not true where the promisor
sells his services. The attempt of an employer to do more than protect
his business from inroads which his former employee is enabled to make
by virtue of a confidential relation or knowledge of trade or business
secrets is to seek a special advantage which is not rightly his. An addi-
tional factor, increasingly apparent, was the inequality of bargaining
power which is ordinarily characteristic of employment contracts, but
not of vendor-vendee contracts. The tendency in England to draw this
distinction as a rule of law culminated just four years after the Jewel
case in Morris v. Saxelby,9 in which the House of Lords held that a
covenant exacted by the purchaser from the vendor on a sale of the
goodwill of a business should be differentiated from a covenant exacted
by an employer against his employee, and that, in the latter case, where
there is no violation of the employer's business secrets, a covenant against
competition will not be enforced. This rule has been generally followed
in Great Britain.'" Its narrowing effect is well brought out in an article
by Fanvell, Cavenants in Restraint of Trade as between Employer and
Employee."
The doctrine of Morris v. Saxelby'3 has been slow to penetrate the
United States; it made virtually no inroads in this country until the
depression dramatically increased the acuteness of the problem of
employee restrictions. No doubt Williston's criticism of Morris v.
Saxelby" was influential in the reluctance of the American courts to
adopt its prineiples. In the 1920 edition of his work on Contracts4
Williston referred to this differentiation as "unadvisable as a positive rule
zo Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 233 (191Z).
x A.C. 688 (Eng. z916).
'°Atwood v. Lamont, 3 K.B. 571 (Eng. 1920); Dossor v. Monaghan, N.I. 2o9
(Eng. 1932).
"144 L.Q. Rev. 66 (1928).
1 ! A.C. 68S (Eng. x916).
13 ibid.
14 WILLivrOx, CoNrrwucTs, sec. 1643 (1920).
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of law." In 1937, in the Revised Edition of the same work,15 the above
statement is reiterated, but it is conceded that "there is a tendency in the
United States to follow the English courts in differentiating between
contracts in restraint of trade and contracts in restraint of employment."
As a consequence of this depression infiltration the law in the United
States is in a state of flux. This is vividly revealed by the treatment of
the matter in the Restatement of Contracts. Section 5 16 (f) apparently
adopts the Williston theory that a bargain by an employee not to com-
pete with his employer is valid and enforceable. Yet the comment on
clause f states that such a promise will not ordinarily be enforced so as
to preclude the employee from exercising skill and knowledge acquired
in his employer's business even if the competition is injurious to the latter,
except so far as to prevent the use of trade secrets or lists of customers,
or unless the services of the employee are of a unique character. The
comment thus sounds more in terms of the English doctrine of Morris
v. Saxelby. 8
That the general confusion on this subject has not escaped Ohio is
well portrayed in Federal Sanitation Co. v. Frankel." There a contract
restraining a salesman from competing with his employer within a cer-
tain territory for twelve months after the termination of his employment
was held valid by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District."" After
discussing Lange v. W erk"9 and Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringel?' and
drawing no distinction between those vendor-vendee covenants and the
employer-employee covenant under consideration, the court, paradoxi-
cally enough, quoted a passage from an annotation to the Connecticut
case of Samuel Stores v. Albrams."1 The Samuels case expressly recog-
nizes and approves Morris v. Saxelby, 2 and the paragraph of the anno-
tation quoted leans decidedly toward the English point of view, stressing
the importance of the confidential and personal nature of the employ-
ment. The obvious ambiguity of the decision renders it of negligible
value as authority for either the older or the Morris v. Saxelby rule.
The decision in Electric Co. v. Kendall," also by the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth District,24 represents, on the other hand, a clear-
1 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, (Rev. Ed.) sec. 1643 (937).
is I A.C. 688 (Eng. x9z6).
17 34. Ohio App. 331, 171 N.E. 339 (1929).
" judges Middleton and Mauck of the Fourth and Judge Hauck of the Fifth Dis-
tricts sitting in place of Judges Sullivan, Vickery, and Levine, of the Eighth District.
9 z Ohio St. S2o (1853).
21 57 Ohio St. 596,49 N.E. o3o (i898).21 94 Conn. 248, iog Ati. 541 (1919), in 9 A.L.R. I45o, at p. 2468.
I A.C. 688 (Eng. i916).
2 Z7 Ohio L. Rep. 679 (1928)-
"' Before Judges Sullivan, Vickery, and Levine,
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cut adherence to the older view. The defendant was placed in charge
of the plaintiff's service department under a contract prohibiting him
from engaging in similar business in the same county for a specified
length of time. The contract was approved, the court again citing
Lange v. Verk 25 as the governing rule in Ohio. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth District demonstrated a similar attitude in Null v. Gull-
liams.2  There a covenant was enforced which precluded the defendant,
who had formerly operated plaintiff's retail milk route, from soliciting,
not only the patronage of the customers previously served by him, but
also everyone else living along the line of the route. The breadth of
the decree necessitates its being viewed as an illustration of the old rule.
The most recent Ohio case in point, Individual Damp Wash Laundry
Co. v. Myers,2" emanating from the Hamilton County Common Pleas
Court, is of little or no help here, since the relief sought and granted-
an injunction against defendant's diverting the route customers of his
former employer for one year-was so modest that it would be obtain-
able even under the English rule.
The employee restriction problem, emphasized by the depression, has
been met by most American courts through the use of equitable and other
discretionary devices, rather than by resort to the English method of
limitation. This technique, like the English rule, tends to narrow the
restraint available to the employer, but not necessarily with the same
results. A covenant, unenforceable under the English rule because it
involves no business secrets, may not be subject to attack by any of these
equitable or discretionary devices. Conversely, a contract which is valid
under Morris v. Saxelby,2" in the light of its substantive restraint, may
not be enforceable when tested by American limitations. One of these
limitations which has been invoked to justify a refusal of relief is the
doctrine of "clean hands."20 This doctrine has been used in Ohio where
the employer has breached the contract which he seeks to enforce,"0 but
any further extension of it has apparently been rejected."' In fact, the
inverse application of the "dean hands" doctrine might be inferred from
the attitude of the court in Null v. Guilliams,32 where the employee left
25 z Ohio St. 520 (s8S3).
26 22 Ohio L. Abs. 6oz (1936).
27 26 Ohio L. Abs. 142, xo Ohio Op. S17 (938).
-s 1 A.C. 688 (Eng. 1916).
') Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, z9o Mass. 549, i9s N.E. 747
(1935); Carpenter v. Southern Properties, 299 S.W. 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
'o Jewel Tea Co. v. Wilson, 20 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) z33 (1912).
"In Red Star Yeast Products Co. v. Hague, 25 Ohio App. 1oo, 157 N.E. 393
(1927), it was declared immaterial whether or not the defendant's discharge was justifable,
since the covenant was to apply on defendant's leaving the employer's service for "what-
soever cause."
32 22 Ohio L. Abs. 6oz (1936).
LAW JOURNAL - MARCH, 1939
the plaintiff's service without notice. Another of these equitable con-
cepts is that of gross inadequacy of consideration. Its application rele-
gates the employer to his remedy at law when the degree of inequality
of benefits under the contract shocks the conscience of the court.8 3
Still another limitations, closely analogous to that of gross inadequacy of
consideration, is the illusory contract doctrine, under which contracts
terminable at will have been declared void, although a reasonable period
of performance under such contracts has generally rendered them
enforceable. 4
A decision by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth District, Red
Star Yeast Products Co. v. Hague,3 has been cited as an example of an
illusory contract made enforceable by "part performance."3 6 The cov-
enant of a salesman not to compete within a certain area for six months
after leaving the plaintiff's service was held valid, the court relying on
the Jewel case as the controlling authority. The court here declared
that, had not the record revealed extended performance under the con-
tract, which was on a monthly basis, it would have been unenforceable,
because four weeks of employment is inadequate in comparison with
six months of restraint. It is submitted that this does not demonstrate
that the court treated the case as one of "part performance" of an
illusory contract, for the contract here was not terminable at will.
Rather did the court, in determining whether or not the contract was
reasonable, include balance of consideration as an essential element.
Such a theory was partially relied upon back in 171x, in the leading
case of Mitchell v. Reynolds."7 For over one hundred years after that
decision it was unsettled whether legal consideration or balanced con-
sideration was necessary to support this type of contract. In 1837 the
doubt was finally resolved in Hitchcock v. Coker,38 . which ruled that
valuable consideration was sufficient. It is demonstrative of the diver-
gency between the recent English and American development that
Morris v. Saxelby" specifically repudiated the use of the balance of
consideration concept as a solution of the problem of employee restraint.
Save for the Frankel case's flirtation with the rule of Morris v. Sax-
elby40 and the suggestion in the Red Star case of a revival of the bal-
anced consideration theory, the Ohio cases to date appear to follow the
3 Love. v. Miami Laundry Co., xi8 Fla. 137, x60 SO. 32 (193s).
" See Note, The Enforceability of a Promise Not to Compete after an Employment
at Will, z9 Col. L. Rev. 347 (z2).
35z Ohio App. 1oo, 157 N.E. 393 (59z7)-
so WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed.) sec. 1643 (1937).
2T 4 Eng. Rep. 347 (1713).
58 112 Eng. Rep. x67 (1837).
39 1 A.C. 688 (Eng. 3916).
40 ibid.
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old rule. But even were Ohio courts in general to espouse one or both
of these limitations the Ohio employer would still stand to gain more
protection through the use of an express covenant than by reliance upon
an implied covenant, as the latter has been restricted in Curry v.
Marquart.41  JOHN R. YOUNG
4' 133 Ohio St. 77, 11 N.E. (2d) 868 (1938).
TRUSTS
RESERVATION OF POWERS IN A LIVING TRUST
The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized the validity of living
trusts in a recent case which represents a complete reversal of the court's
former attitude toward these devices.' Due to the great number of living
trusts now existing in this state, as well as elsewhere, and to the great
degree of convenience that may be achieved through the continued rec-
ognition thereof, a discussion of the development of the problem in Ohio
does not seem inappropriate. To attempt a review of all the decisions
in this country dealing with the subject would result in a work too
lengthy for the purposes for which this article is intended. This dis-
cussion, therefore, shall be directed chiefly to the development of the
law in Ohio and references to authority outside the state shall be made
only for the purpose of comparison and contrast.
In October of 1913, one Thomas H. White conveyed certain real
and personal property to the Cleveland Trust Co., giving the trust com-
pany broad powers in the matter of investment and reinvestment and
unrestricted power to manage as if the absolute owner, but retaining for
himself the net income for life and such of the principal as the trustee
should deem necessary. White was to have free use of the realty and
was to pay the taxes thereon, was to have the right to demand from
the trustee a transfer of voting rights in certain stocks, and was to have
the right, subject to the trust company's approval, to revoke the trust.
The agreement further stipulated that after the death of White the
property was to be held in trust for certain named individuals. On the
same day, White executed a will devising all of the property to the trust
company to be disposed of according to the terms of the trust agreement.
Mr. White died in 1914. In January of 1934, the trust company
brought an action under section 10504-66 of the General Code for a
construction of the so-called trust agreement. The Common Pleas court
of Cuyahoga County held the trust agreement was testamentary in
1 Clmeland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio St. z, IS N.E. (2d) 627 (1938).
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